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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the role of young adult mortality on child labor
and educational decisions. We show that, in the absence of appropriate insurance
mechanisms, the level of child labor is ine±cient. It may be too high if parents are not
very altruistic and anticipate positive transfers from their children in the future, but
it can also be too low, in particular when parents expect to make positive transfers
to their children in the future. Imperfect capital markets unambiguously increase
the equilibrium level of child labor. We also show that a cash transfer conditional
on child's schooling can always restore e±ciency regarding child labor.
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11 Introduction
Child labor is a pressing and important social issue. According to the ILO, about
one ¯fth of all children between 5 and 14 were considered as working in the world
in 2000. Child labor is highly concentrated in developing countries, with 60% of
all working children living in the Asian-Paci¯c region. The highest proportion of
working children is however found in Sub-Saharan Africa, with an average 29% of
children working.
In a seminal paper, Basu and Van (1998) show that, if adult and child labor are
substitutes and parents send their children to work only when the family is poor,
multiple equilibria can exist. This gives scope for policy interventions such as a ban
that moves the economy from a `bad' equilibrium, where both children and adults
are working for low wages, to a good one, where children do not work and wages are
high.
Another approach attempts to understand how child labor can arise as the ratio-
nal decision by parents who take into account the trade-o® between child labor and
schooling. In this perspective, there are two possible explanations for the incidence
of child labor. The ¯rst possibility is that private returns from education are not high
enough. This view is apparently contradicted by several empirical studies, such as
Psacharopoulos (1997), which show that returns from education are relatively high
in developing countries.1
The second possibility is that several constraints force parents to take ine±cient
decisions with respect to child labor. Baland and Robinson (2000) explicitly consider
the trade-o® between child labor and the accumulation of human capital. In a model
in which parents are fully altruistic with respect to their children, they show that an
ine±ciently high level of child labor may arise when parents leave their children no
bequests or when capital markets are imperfect.2 With perfect capital markets and
positive bequests, parents always choose the privately e±cient level of child labor,
as they perfectly internalize the negative impact of child labor on their children
1However, Couralet (2002) argues that estimations of the rate of return to education in developing
countries are biased upwards. First, the great heterogeneity of education quality in developing
countries induces a selection bias: the better the quality of education, the longer the duration
of the studies. Also, several estimates of returns to education do not take into account other
characteristics of the individual, such as the socioeconomic background, which also contributes to
an over-valuation of these returns.
2This ¯nding seems to be con¯rmed in the light of empirical studies. The impact of liquidity
constraints on child labor was investigated in Edmonds (2004) using South African data, by ana-
lyzing the e®ect of anticipated pension income on child labor and schooling decisions. He shows
that once households become eligible for the pension income, child labor declines and schooling
increases, suggesting the presence of liquidity constraints.
2future earning ability. Clearly, however, to obtain this result, parents must perfectly
anticipate returns to education.
However, human capital is a risky investment (see e.g., Becker, 1964; Levhari
and Weiss, 1974). First, parents do not observe perfectly their children's abilities
nor the quality of schooling. Second, future labor market conditions are subject
to unpredictable events. It can however be argued that these sources of risk a®ect
equally developed economies, so that they do not constitute a likely explanation
for the prevalence of child labor in poor countries.3 Another source of uncertainty
consists in the high mortality rates among young adults that prevail nowadays in
poor countries, and directly a®ect returns to education. Table 1 presents some data
on life expectancy and mortality rates for selected countries.
These ¯gures illustrate the huge discrepancies in life expectancy between devel-
oping and developed countries, but also among developing countries. In Asia or
Latin America, life expectancy is on average 10 years lower than in a developed
economy, but 20 to 30 years higher than in most African countries. Infant and
under-¯ve mortality rates certainly explain part of these di®erences, but they are
not directly relevant to our question. More interesting is the evidence on mortality
rates between ages 5 and 40. In Africa, the probability of dying between 5 and 40 lies
between 13% and 62.5% while it reaches barely 10% in other developing countries
(and less than 5% in developed countries). Indeed according to the World Health
Report (World Health Organization, 2004), the average mortality rate between 15
and 44 exceeded 25% in Africa in 2004.
Clearly, there is also a high correlation between the prevalence of child labor and
mortality among young adults. Figure 1 represents this relation for 126 developing
countries.
In this paper we investigate the relationship between young adult mortality and
child labor. To do this, we present a modi¯ed version of Baland and Robinson
(2000) to allow for children's uncertain lifetime and the possibility of premature
death. We show that even when capital markets are perfect and intergenerational
transfers are positive, the level of child labor is ine±cient. It is ine±ciently high when
parents are not too altruistic and anticipate positive transfers from their children
in the future, as in the old age security model. This is because, given the possible
death of their child, they tend to favor a certain investment, such as saving, to an
uncertain one, such as human capital. However, we shall also show that child labor
is ine±ciently low when parents anticipate to make positive future transfers to their
children. Indeed, with the possible death of their child, parents prefer an investment
3Razin (1976) focuses on the advantage of physical capital compared to human capital, as the
latter is not transferable, in the presence of premature mortality.
3Table 1: Demographic ¯gures
Country Life expectancy Mortality rate between





















Cote d'Ivoire 41.0 341
Mozambique 38.1 363
Kenya 44.6 373






Source: Human Development Report (United Nations, 2004)
a
Data refer to the probability at birth of not surviving to age 40 minus under-¯ve mortality rates.
that is contingent on their child being alive, such as education, to one which is not,
such as savings. In this respect, it is striking that Sub-Saharan Africa presents the
highest young mortality rates, the largest proportion of working children as well as
a generalized practice of large scale transfers from young working adults to their
parents.
Closest to this paper is that of Eswaran (2000). There, he builds an old-age
security model, where parents simultaneously decide how many children to have
and whether to send them to school or to work, taking into account that some
of them will die before adulthood. The combination of high mortality rates with
lack of access to capital markets induces parents to have many children to ensure
that enough will survive to provide them with old-age support. Child labor is then
used to maintain income in large families. Our paper stresses another mechanism,
4Figure 1: Mortality rates vs. Child labor
by positing exogenous fertility and perfect capital markets, and focussing on the
imperfections of the insurance market (against child mortality).4 Moreover, we also
show that while child labor is too high in the old-age fertility model, it can also be
too low when parental altruism is strong.5
More recently, Pouliot (2005) introduces uncertainty in returns to human capital
into Baland and Robinson (2000). He shows that, if the return to education is
a continuous random variable, the level of child labor is ine±ciently high in the
absence of insurance markets, even when bequests and savings are interior. Parents
then always prefer to increase child labor at the expense of education, as the latter
is now a risky investment. We show that this result depends crucially on the type of
uncertainty that is being considered. When young adult mortality is introduced, the
issue of contingent transfers becomes critical. Additionally, to explain the prevalence
of child labor in developing countries, one would need to show that uncertainty in
the returns to education is more widespread there. Unfortunately no evidence is
presented towards this end6.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model, the
results of which are presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss possible policy
4Our results easily generalize to a situation where fertility is endogenous.
5Strulik (2004) builds a growth model combining fertility, child mortality, child labor and edu-
cation to analyze the impact of child mortality on economic growth. However, human capital does
not enter explicitly into the utility function of parents, and there is no inter-generational transfers,
while they play a crucial role in our results.
6Note that the existence of social security in most developed countries is probably not enough to
justify the fact that child labor is lower in such countries. Indeed, most bene¯ts do not take directly
into account the level of education of the recipients and so do not really constitute insurance against
such risks.
5interventions, and the last Section concludes.
2 The model
We consider two periods, t = 1;2. In each period, the production technology is
such that one unit of labor produces one unit of the numeraire good. The wage
rate is equal to 1. There are Lp parents who supply A e±ciency units of labor in
each period. Each parent has one child. In the ¯rst period, the parent decides the
amount of time his child spends working, lc 2 [0;1], where (1 ¡ lc) represents the
time she spends at school. The parent also decides the amount he consumes, c1,
and the amount he chooses to save, s. The child takes no decision in period 1. We
consider that capital markets are perfect, so that s can be positive or negative, and
we assume that the discount rate and the interest rate are both equal to zero. In the
end of this Section we discuss the implications of imperfect capital markets, that is,
the situation in which the parents can save but cannot borrow.
While all parents live in the second period7, some children may die at the end of
period 1 with probability (1¡p). We assume that p, the probability that a child lives
in period 2, is exogenous 8. In period 2, if she survived, the child is now an adult
and supplies h(1 ¡ lc) e±ciency units of labor. h(:) represents the human capital
she possesses in period 2 if she worked lc units of time in period 1. We assume that
an increase in schooling increases the amount of human capital, but at a decreasing
rate, that is, h0(1¡lc) > 0, and h00(1¡lc) < 0. We also assume h(0) = 1, h0(0) = 1
and h0(1) = 0 (which will imply that the optimal value of lc is interior). In period 2,
the child, when alive, chooses the amount she consumes, cc; and the amount ¿ she
transfers to her parent. Each parent chooses the amount b he gives to his child. If
the child dies at the end of period 1, no transfers can be made, so that b = ¿ = 0:
Transfers are positive or nil: b ¸ 0; ¿ ¸ 09.
We ¯rst consider the situation under which there is a perfect insurance market.
The only risk faced by a parent is the possibility that his child dies at the end of
period 1, in which case he cannot, in period 2, give or receive transfers. The insurance
contract is such that if P is the premium a parent decides to pay in period 1, he
receives an amount I = P=(1 ¡ p) in period 2 if his child dies, and 0 if not.
7Note that the possibility that parents die after the ¯rst period complicates substantially the
analysis, but yields more ambiguous results.
8Empirical evidence seems to give support to this assumption of exogenous probability. Accord-
ing to the World Health Report (World Health Organization, 2004), in the age range of 15-29 years,
42.5% of deaths in AFRO E (African countries with high child and adult mortality rates) can be
attributed to AIDS epidemics, while 18% are caused by war and violence.
9Our results do not change signi¯cantly if we assume instead that the parents alone control all
the transfers, that is, that they leave bequests that can be positive or negative.
6In period 1, the parent faces the following budget constraint
c1 = A + lc ¡ s ¡ (1 ¡ p)I (1)
where c1, his consumption in period 1, is equal to the household labor earnings,
A + lc, minus the amount he saves, s, and the insurance premium, (1 ¡ p)I (for
simplicity, we assume that children do not consume in period 1). In period 2, the
parent's budget constraint di®ers depending on whether his child died at the end
of period 1 or not. We let ca
2 and cd
2 denote parental consumption in period 2 if his
child is alive and not alive, respectively. If the child is alive, the parent's budget
constraint is
ca
2 = A + s ¡ b + ¿ (2)
and if the child died at the end of period 1, the parent's budget constraint in period
2 is
cd
2 = A + s + I (3)
Given his budget constraints, a parent chooses lc;s and (1¡p)I in period 1 and,
in period 2, b if his child is alive, to maximize the following utility function:
Wp = U(c1) +
h
pU(ca




where Wc represents the child's utility in period 2, if she is alive, and ± measures
parental altruism.
In period 2, if she is alive, the child's budget constraint is:
cc = h(1 ¡ lc) + b ¡ ¿ (5)
and the child chooses ¿ to maximize
Wc = V (cc) + ¸[U(ca
2) + ±Wc] =




where ¸ measures ¯lial altruism.
Replacing (6) into (4), the parent's utility function can be rewritten as:









We assume that U and V are both strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice
continuously di®erentiable. We also assume that ±¸ < 1, to restrict the e®ect of the
mutual altruism multiplier.
The ¯rst-order conditions with respect to child labor, savings, insurance and
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2) = ±V 0(cc) and b > 0 (13)
U0(ca
2) > ±V 0(cc) and b = 0 (14)
Note that, in the ¯rst period, parents take into account the impact of their decisions
in the ¯rst period on the amount of ¯lial transfers, when positive.10 Equation (12)
states that a parent chooses (1¡p)I so as to equalize his ¯rst period marginal utility
to his second period marginal utility if his child dies.
Similarly, the ¯rst-order condition with respect to ¯lial transfers, ¿; are given by:
V 0(cc) = ¸U0(ca
2) and ¿ > 0 (15)
V 0(cc) > ¸U0(ca
2) and ¿ = 0 (16)
Equations (13) and (15) cannot hold simultaneously. The non-negativity constraints
on transfers allow us to distinguish between three di®erent situations: (1) Parental
transfers, with b > 0 and ¿ = 0; (2) Filial transfers, with b = 0 and ¿ > 0; and (3)
No transfers, with b = ¿ = 0, in which both the parent and the child choose to make
no transfers. Lemma 1 establishes the existence of these three cases.
Lemma 1. If ±¸ < 1, there always exists [±;¸] such that ¯lial transfers are positive,
[±0;¸0] such that parental transfers are positive, and [±00;¸00] such that intergenera-
tional transfers are nil.
10Note however that there is no impact of the insurance premium, as this gives rise to bene¯ts for
the parent only if his child dies, and transfers are therefore nil. Parental transfers have no impact
either as they are contemporaneous to ¯lial transfers.
8Proof. Consider the case in which ¿ > 0. For all feasible values of ca
2 and cc, there








Note that 2A + 1 corresponds to the highest possible parental income in period 2,
as in this case, the child did not go to school and the parent saved all his income
in period 1. Similarly, h(0) corresponds to the level of human capital that the child
will have if she did not receive any education. This condition implies that even if
parents transfer all their income in period 2, children with zero education will still
be willing to transfer strictly positive amounts of income to their parents.
The proof for the case of parental transfers and no transfers can be obtained
with a similar argument.
Typically, transfers are nil when ± and ¸ are small enough, parental transfers
will be positive if ± is high and ¸ is low, and ¯lial transfers will be positive if ¸ is
high and ± is low.
3 Main results
When transfers are not nil, the parent fully internalizes the impact of his decision
regarding child labor on the earning ability of his child in period 2. As a result, he
equalizes the expected marginal bene¯t of schooling, ph0(1 ¡ le
c); to 1; its cost in
terms of lost labor income in period 1. This corresponds to the Pareto e±cient level
of child labor, which is decreasing in the probability of survival. This result is stated
in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1. With perfect insurance markets, child labor is e±cient i® transfers
are not nil. The e±cient level of child labor is such that
ph0(1 ¡ le
c) = 1 (18)
Proof. We propose here a brief sketch of the proof. Equation (18) obtains by com-
bining equations (9), (11), (12) and (13) when parental transfers are positive. When
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2) + V 00(cc)
(20)
Then by combining equations (8), (10), (12), (15), (19), and (20) we obtain the
result. To show that this is e±cient, one has to show that no pro¯table contract
can be made between the parent and the child such that the latter would be ready
to pay for a marginal increase in her education more than its opportunity cost to
her parent, which is exactly equal to 1. The ine±ciency of parental decisions when
transfers are nil can be proven following Baland and Robinson (2000). Thus, with






±V (cc) > 1:
We now turn to the consequences of the absence of an insurance market. In this
case, equation (12) does not hold as parents have no more access to an insurance
contract. We now determine the equilibrium level of child labor that prevails in
the three di®erent situations of parental transfers, ¯lial transfers and no transfers.
When parental transfers are positive, combining equations (9), (11) and (13), the
equilibrium level of child labor is determined by:
ph0(1 ¡ l¤







When ¯lial transfers are positive, using equations (8), (10), (15), (19), and (20), one
obtains:
ph0(1 ¡ l¤
c) = p + (1 ¡ p)
¸U00(ca
2) + V 00(cc)
±¸2U00(ca







The additional term in the expression corresponds to the anticipation by the parent
of the impact of his decisions on ¯lial transfers. Finally, in the absence of transfers,












In all these situations, the equilibrium level of child labor is monotonically in-
creasing with mortality rates. This is expressed in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. With or without perfect insurance markets, an increase in child
mortality increases the equilibrium level of child labor.
10Proof. With perfect insurance, this result is straightforward by (18). Without per-
fect insurance, a proof in the case of parental transfers is presented in the Ap-
pendix.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. An increase in mortality rates
lowers the expected return to education, which induces parents to reduce their in-
vestment in education and increase the level of child labor. We now show that the
impact of mortality on child labor goes well beyond its direct impact on the ex-
pected returns to education. Indeed, in the absence of insurance, the uncertainty
about child survival leads parents to choose ine±cient levels of child labor. This
holds even if capital markets are perfect, and transfers are not nil.11 The impact of
uncertainty on child labor, however, critically depends on the direction of intergen-
erational transfers.
3.1 Case 1: Filial transfers
We focus on the situation where ¯lial transfers are positive, which corresponds to
the old-age security model. We obtain:
Proposition 3. If ¿ > 0, the equilibrium level of child labor is ine±ciently high or
low. It is too high if ±¸ < 1
2, and it is too low for ±¸ ! 1.
Proof. First note that with positive ¯lial transfers, ca
2 > cd




c) = p + (1 ¡ p)
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2) + V 00(cc)
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We see that if ±¸ ! 1,this result may no longer hold and the equilibrium level of
child labor is ine±ciently low.
This result is surprising at ¯rst sight, since one would believe that, in the absence
of insurance, parents would rather choose the \certain" income (i.e., child labor) at
the expense of the uncertain one (i.e., child education). The above proposition shows
that this intuition does not always hold. From equation (24) in the proof, we can
distinguish two opposite e®ects determining the equilibrium level of child labor. The








2), is directly related to
the idea that parents prefer a certain income than the risky investment in education.
(Note that, when doing so, they internalise the impact of their child labor and saving
choices on ¯lial transfers in period 2.) The term 1 ¡ ±¸ represents the mirror e®ect
11When transfers are nil, the level of child labor is ine±cient even in the presence of perfect
insurance market, as discussed in Proposition 1. To properly identify the impact of the absence of
an insurance market, we thus need to focus on situations where transfers are not nil.
11which operates in the opposite direction. Indeed, under two-sided altruism, a parent
gives more weight to his own utility when his child is alive what induces him to invest
more in education. If ±¸ is low enough, the strategic e®ect dominates the mirror
e®ect, and the level of child labor is ine±ciently high.
3.2 Case 2: Parental transfers
Suppose that parental transfers are strictly positive: b > 0. We obtain:
Proposition 4. If b > 0, the equilibrium level of child labor is ine±ciently low in
the absence of insurance markets.
Proof. With positive parental transfers, ca
2 < cd
2: In equation (21), one obtains:
ph0(1 ¡ l¤







Once again, the result is counter-intuitive. When parental transfers are positive,
child labor is too low. The reason for this is that a parent have two ways to make
transfers to his child: reducing child labor to increase the child's human capital
and therefore raise her future income, or making his child work, saving and then
transferring in period 2. The latter strategy however implies that, if the child dies,
the parent will be left with too much income in period 2. As a result, parents choose
to invest more in the contingent transfer, education.
So far, we assumed capital markets to be perfect. Consider now that they are
imperfect so that parents can save but cannot borrow. We denote the equilibrium
level of child labor by li
c.
If savings are at the corner, the ¯rst-order conditions with respect to s (see





+ (1 ¡ p)U0(cd
2) and ¿ ¸ 0 (25)
since with s = 0, d¿
ds = 0. One obtains by combining equations (9), (13), and (25)
(in the case of parental transfers) or equations (8), (15), (25), (19), and (20) (in the
case of ¯lial transfers):
ph0(1 ¡ li
c) > ph0(1 ¡ l¤
c) (26)
that is, under imperfect capital markets, the equilibrium level of child labor is always
higher under the assumption of imperfect capital markets.
12Proof. omitted
As in Baland and Robinson (2000), imperfect capital markets always increase
child labor. Since parents cannot borrow to transfer income to the present, they
ine±ciently increase child labor to this end. We showed above that in the case
of parental transfers or in the case of ¯lial transfers with ±¸ ! 1, child labor is
ine±ciently low. Imperfect capital markets may thus help to reduce this ine±ciency
(even though the resulting equilibrium level of child labor can now be too low or
too high). In the case of ¯lial transfers when ±¸ < 1
2, capital market imperfections
increase further the level of child labor, making it even more ine±cient.
4 E±ciency-restoring policy interventions in the old-
age security model
In Section 3, we have shown that, in the absence of insurance markets, parents may
choose an ine±ciently high or low level of child labor depending on the levels of
parental and ¯lial altruism. In this section, we shall focus on the situation where
¯lial transfers are positive, and ±¸ < 1
2. As shown in Cain (1982) or Nugent (1985),
in many developing countries, ¯lial transfers and the old-age security motive play
indeed a major role for fertility or education decisions. Moreover, African countries
in which early mortality is really an issue are also characterized by impressively high
levels of ¯lial transfers (see e.g., Caldwell and Caldwell, 1987). In this section, we
discuss some policy interventions that can potentially restore e±ciency in such a
setting.
A tax schedule that replicates the insurance scheme would obviously be e±ciency-
enhancing. But, as much as an insurance contract, such a direct scheme might not
be implementable. Public pensions is potentially an attractive alternative policy,
since we have shown that ine±cient levels of child labor were related to the old-age
security motive. The introduction of a fully-funded public pension has no impact,
given that we have already assumed perfect capital markets. However, a pay-as-
you-go pension system provides insurance to parents since it constitutes a transfer
from surviving children to all parents, and so may restore e±ciency in this setting.
Another alternative is to introduce cash transfers conditional on child's educa-
tion. Such conditional cash transfers are increasingly popular in developing coun-
tries, as attested by the Bolsa Escola program in Brazil or PROGRESA in Mexico
(see e.g., Ravallion and Wodon, 2000). The conditional cash transfer distorts in-
centives in favor of the child's education, while simultaneously compensating poor
families for foregone child labor earnings. Consider that a parent receives in period
131 a cash transfer proportional to the amount of education he provides to his child,
1 ¡ lc. We let this transfer be ¯nanced by a tax on surviving children in period 2.
The tax is uniform, and depends on the average level of education in the economy
(we assume that the economy is populated by a large number of individuals)12. We
can then show:
Proposition 5. There always exists a conditional cash transfers program, ¯nanced
by a uniform tax, such that the equilibrium level of child labor is e±cient.
Proof. The parent's ¯rst period budget constraint becomes
c1 = A + lc ¡ s + µ(1 ¡ lc)
where µ represents the transfer per unit of education provided. In period 2, the
parents' budget constraints are as before given by equations (2) and (3). Let 1 ¡ lc
represent the average level of education in the economy. Under a balanced budget
constraint, the tax we need to impose on surviving children in period 2 is equal to
(µ(1 ¡ lc)=p), so that the child's budget constraint in period 2 is now given by
cc = h(1 ¡ lc) ¡ ¿ ¡ µ(1 ¡ lc)=p
The ¯rst-order condition with respect to lc is now given by:














Combining this with equation (10), (15), (19), (20), one gets:
ph0(1 ¡ lc) = (1 ¡ µ)
"
p + (1 ¡ p)
¸U00(ca









If µ = 0, we ¯nd the initial equilibrium given by equation (22). If µ = 1; the cash
transfer is such that parents choose lc = 0: Given our assumptions on U and V ,
the level of child labor de¯ned by equation (27) is a continuous function of µ: As
a result, there always exists a level of µ that implements the e±cient level of child
labor.
As a result, an appropriate system of conditional cash transfers can always bring
back the e±cient level of child labor. It should however be noted that global e±ciency
is not achieved, as decisions over savings and transfers are typically ine±cient.
12Note that our results do not change if we consider alternative ¯nancing mechanisms, such as a
tax levied on the parents' ¯rst or second period income or a budget de¯cit. These schemes have no
impact on the parental decision but only on the net income levels of the agents.
145 Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the impact of young adult mortality on child
labor and educational decisions. We have shown that, in the absence of appropriate
insurance mechanisms, the level of child labor is ine±cient. It is too high if parents
are not too altruistic and anticipate positive transfers from their children in the
future, but it can also be too low, for instance if parents expect to make future
positive transfers to their children in the future. We also show that a cash transfer
program conditional on child's schooling can always restore e±ciency regarding child
labor.
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A Proof of Proposition 2
A.1 Parental transfers
We concentrate in the case in which parental transfers are positive and so ¯lial
transfers are nil.
Proof. The ¯rst-order conditions are given by equations (13), (9), and (11). These
equations then de¯ne three implicit equations, namely
F1(lc;s;b;p;¸;±) = ±V 0(h(1 ¡ lc) + b) ¡ U0(A + s ¡ b) = 0 (28)
F2(lc;s;b;p;¸;±) = U0(A + lc ¡ s) ¡ p
±V 0(h(1 ¡ lc) + b)
1 ¡ ±¸
h0(1 ¡ lc) = 0 (29)
F3(lc;s;b;p;¸;±) = ¡U0(A + lc ¡ s) + p
U0(A + s ¡ b)
1 ¡ ±¸
+ (1 ¡ p)U0(A + s) = 0
(30)





































































±V 00(cc) + U00(ca




1¡±¸ h0 U00(c1) + p
±V 00(cc)






1¡±¸ ¡U00(c1) U00(c1) + p
U00(ca
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The determinant of this matrix is negative due to the concavity of this problem.











































































































































Combining (29) and (30) we obtain
±V 0(cc)
1 ¡ ±¸















































The case of ¯lial transfers can be obtained upon request from the authors.
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